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Abstract—The C and C++ programming languages are noto-
riously insecure yet remain indispensable. Developers therefore
resort to a multi-pronged approach to find security issues before
adversaries. These include manual, static, and dynamic program
analysis. Dynamic bug finding tools—henceforth “sanitizers”—
can find bugs that elude other types of analysis because they
observe the actual execution of a program, and can therefore
directly observe incorrect program behavior as it happens.
A vast number of sanitizers have been prototyped by aca-
demics and refined by practitioners. We provide a systematic
overview of sanitizers with an emphasis on their role in finding
security issues. Specifically, we taxonomize the available tools and
the security vulnerabilities they cover, describe their performance
and compatibility properties, and highlight various trade-offs.
I. INTRODUCTION
C and C++ remain the languages of choice for low-level
systems software such as operating system kernels, runtime
libraries, and browsers. A key reason is that they are efficient
and leave the programmer in full control of the underlying
hardware. On the flip side, the programmer must ensure that
every memory access is valid, that no computation leads to
undefined behavior, etc. In practice, programmers routinely fall
short of meeting these responsibilities and introduce bugs that
make the code vulnerable to exploitation.
At the same time, memory corruption exploits are getting
more sophisticated [1]–[4], bypassing widely-deployed mitiga-
tions such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
and Data Execution Prevention (DEP). Code-reuse attacks such
as Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) corrupt control data
such as function pointers or return addresses to hijack the
control-flow of the program [1]. Data-only attacks such as
Data-Oriented Programming (DOP) leverage instructions that
can be invoked on legal control-flow paths to compromise a
program by corrupting only its non-control data [4].
As a first line of defense against bugs, programmers use
analysis tools to identify security problems before their software
is deployed in production. These tools rely on either static
program analysis, dynamic program analysis, or a combination.
Static tools analyze the program source code and produce
results that are conservatively correct for all possible executions
of the code [5]–[9]. In contrast, dynamic bug finding tools—
often called “sanitizers”—analyze a single program execution
and output a precise analysis result valid for a single run only.
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TABLE I
EXPLOIT MITIGATIONS VS. SANITIZERS
Exploit Mitigations Sanitizers
The goal is to ... Mitigate attacks Find vulnerabilities
Used in ... Production Pre-release
Performance budget ... Very limited Much higher
Policy violations lead to ... Program termination Problem diagnosis
Violations triggered at location of bug ... Sometimes Always
Tolerance for FPs is ... Zero Somewhat higher
Surviving benign errors is ... Desired Not desired
Sanitizers are now in widespread use and responsible for
many vulnerability discoveries. However, despite their ubiquity
and critical role in finding vulnerabilities, sanitizers are often
not well-understood, which hinders their further adoption and
development. This paper provides a systematic overview of
sanitizers with an emphasis on their role in finding security
vulnerabilities. We taxonomize the available tools and the
security vulnerabilities they cover, describe their performance
and compatibility properties, and highlight various trade-offs.
To foster further adoption and development, we conclude the
paper with viable deployment directions for developers and
future research directions for researchers.
A. Exploit Mitigations vs. Sanitizers
Sanitizers are similar to many well-known exploit mitigations
in that both types of tools insert inlined reference monitors
(IRMs) into the program to enforce a fine-grained security
policy. Despite this similarity, however, exploit mitigations
and sanitizers significantly differ in what they aim to achieve
and how they are used. These differences reflect in the design
requirements, as shown in Table I.
The biggest difference between the two types of tools lies
in the type of security policy they enforce. Exploit mitigations
deploy a policy aimed at detecting or preventing attacks,
whereas sanitizers aim to pinpoint the precise locations of
buggy program statements. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [10],
Data-Flow Integrity (DFI) [11] and Write Integrity Testing
(WIT) [12] are examples of exploit mitigations because they
detect deviations from legal control or data flow paths, which
usually happen as a consequence of a bug’s exploitation, but
do not necessarily happen at the precise locations of vulnerable
program statements. Bounds checking tools, in contrast, could
be considered sanitizers because violations of their policies
trigger directly at the locations of vulnerable statements.
Exploit mitigations are meant to be deployed in production,
thus put stringent requirements on various design aspects.
First, exploit mitigations rarely see real-world adoption if
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they incur non-negligible run-time overhead [13]. Sanitizers
have less stringent performance requirements because they are
only used for testing. Second, false positive detections in an
exploit mitigations are unacceptable because they terminate
the program. Sanitizers may tolerate false alerts to the extent
that developers are willing to review false bug reports. Finally,
surviving benign errors (e.g., writes to padding) is allowed
and often desired in production systems for reliability and
availability reasons, whereas sanitizers aim to detect these bugs
precisely since their exploitability is unknown.
II. LOW-LEVEL VULNERABILITIES
Among a wide spectrum of security-related bugs, this paper
covers bugs that have specific security implications in C/C++.
This includes not only undefined behavior, but also well-defined
behaviors that are potentially dangerous in the absence of type
and memory safety. We briefly describe the bugs and how
they can be exploited to leak information, escalate privilege,
or execute arbitrary code.
A. Memory Safety Violations
A program is memory safe if pointers in the program only
access their intended referents, while those intended referents
are valid. The intended referent of a pointer is the object from
whose base address the pointer was derived. Depending on the
type of the referent, it is either valid between its allocation and
deallocation (for heap-allocated referents), between a function
call and its return (for stack-allocated referents), between the
creation and the destruction of its associated thread (for thread-
local referents), or indefinitely (for global referents).
Memory safety violations are among the most severe
security vulnerabilities and have been studied extensively in
the literature [13], [14]. Their exploitation can lead to code
injection [15], control-flow hijacking [1], [16], [17], privilege
escalation [18], information leakage [19], and program crashes.
1) Spatial Safety Violations: Accessing memory that is not
(entirely) within the bounds of the intended referent of a pointer
constitutes a spatial safety violation. Buffer overflows are a
typical example of a spatial safety violation. A buffer overflow
happens when the program writes beyond the end of a buffer. If
the intended referent of a vulnerable access is a subobject (e.g.,
a struct field), and if an attacker writes to another subobject
within the same object, then we refer to this as an intra-object
overflow. Listing 1 shows an intra-object overflow vulnerability
which can be exploited to perform a privilege escalation attack.
struct A { char name[7]; bool isAdmin; };
struct A a; char buf[8];
memcpy(/* dst */ a.name, /* src */ buf, sizeof(buf));
Listing 1. Intra-object overflow vulnerability which can be exploited to
overwrite security-critical non-control data
2) Temporal Safety Violations: A temporal safety violation
occurs when the program accesses a referent that is no
longer valid. When an object becomes invalid, which usually
happens by explicitly deallocating it, all the pointers pointing
to that object become dangling. Accessing an object through
a dangling pointer is called a use-after-free. Accessing a local
object outside of its scope or after the function returns is
referred to as use-after-scope and use-after-return, respectively.
This type of bug becomes exploitable when the attacker can
reuse and control the freed region, as illustrated in Listing 2.
struct A { void (*func)(void); };
struct A *p = (struct A *)malloc(sizeof(struct A));
free(p); // Pointer becomes dangling
...
p->func(); // Use-after-free
Listing 2. Use-after-free vulnerability which can be exploited to hijack the
control-flow of the program
B. Use of Uninitialized Variables
Variables have an indeterminate value until they are ini-
tialized [20], [21]. C++14 allows this indeterminate value to
propagate to other variables if both the source and destination
variables have an unsigned narrow character type. Any other
use of an uninitialized variable results in undefined behavior.
The effects of this undefined behavior depend on many factors,
including the compiler and compiler flags that were used to
compile the program. In most cases, indeterminate values are
in fact the (partial) contents of previously deallocated variables
that occupied the same memory range as the uninitialized vari-
able. As these previously deallocated variables may sometimes
hold security-sensitive values, reads of uninitialized memory
may be part of an information leakage attack, as illustrated in
Listing 3.
struct A { int data[2]; };
struct A *p = (struct A *)malloc(sizeof(struct A));
p->data[0] = 0; // Partial initialization
send_to_untrusted_client(p, sizeof(struct A));
Listing 3. Use of a partially-initialized variable which becomes vulnerable as
the uninitialized value crosses a trust boundary
C. Pointer Type Errors
C and C++ support several casting operators and language
constructs that can lead memory accesses to misinterpret the
data stored in their referents, thereby violating type safety.
Pointer type errors typically result from unsafe casts. C allows
all casts between pointer types, as well as casts between
integer and pointer types. The C++ reinterpret_cast type
conversion operator is similarly not subject to any restrictions.
The static_cast and dynamic_cast operators do have
restrictions. static_cast forbids pointer to integer casts,
and casting between pointers to objects that are unrelated by
inheritance. However, it does allow casting of a pointer from a
base class to a derived class (also called downcasting), as well
as all casts from and to the void* type. Bad-casting (often
referred to as type confusion) happens when a downcast pointer
has neither the run-time type of its referent, nor one of the
referent’s ancestor types.
class Base { virtual void func(); };
class Derived : public Base { public: int extra; };
Base b[2];
Derived *d = static_cast<Derived *>(&b[0]); // Bad-casting
d->extra = ...; // Type-unsafe, out-of-bounds access, which
// overwrites the vtable pointer of b[1]
Listing 4. Bad-casting vulnerability leading to a type- and memory-unsafe
memory access
To downcast safely, programmers must use the dynamic_cast
operator, which performs run-time type checks and returns a
null pointer if the check fails. Using dynamic_cast is entirely
optional, however, and introduces additional run-time overhead.
Type errors can also occur when casting between function
pointer types. Again, C++’s reinterpret_cast and C impose
no restrictions on casts between incompatible function pointer
types. If a function is called indirectly through a function
pointer of the wrong type, the target function might misinterpret
its arguments, which leads to even more type errors. Finally, C
also allows type punning through union types. If the program
reads from a union through a different member object than the
one that was used to store the data, the underlying memory
may be misinterpreted. Furthermore, if the member object used
for reading is larger than the member object used to store
the data, then the upper bytes read from the union will take
unspecified values.
D. Variadic Function Misuse
C/C++ support variadic functions, which accept a variable
number of variadic function arguments in addition to a fixed
number of regular function arguments. The variadic function’s
source code does not specify the number or types of these
variadic arguments. Instead, the fixed arguments and the
function semantics encode the expected number and types
of variadic arguments. Variadic arguments can be accessed
and simultaneously typecast using va_arg. It is, in general,
impossible to statically verify that va_arg accesses a valid
argument, or that it casts the argument to a valid type. This lack
of static verification can lead to type errors, spatial memory
safety violations, and uses of uninitialized values.
char *fmt2; // User-controlled format string
sprintf(fmt2, user_input, ...);
// prints attacker-chosen stack contents if fmt2 contains
// too many format specifiers
// or overwrites memory if fmt2 contains %n
printf(fmt2, ...);
Listing 5. Simplified version of CVE-2012-0809; user-provided input was
mistakenly used as part of a larger format string passed to a printf-like function
E. Other Vulnerabilities
There are other operations that may pose security risks in the
absence of type and memory safety. Notable examples include
overflow errors which may be exploitable when such values
are used in memory allocation or pointer arithmetic operations.
If an attacker-controlled integer value is used to calculate a
buffer size or an array index, the attacker could overflow that
value to allocate a smaller buffer than expected (as illustrated
in Listing 6), or to bypass existing array index checks, thereby
triggering an out-of-bounds access.
// newsize can overflow depending on len
int newsize = oldsize + len + 100;
newsize *= 2;
// The new buffer may be smaller than len
buf = xmlRealloc(buf, newsize);
memcpy(buf + oldsize, string, len); // Out-of-bounds access
Listing 6. Simplified version of CVE-2017-5029; a signed integer overflow
vulnerability that can lead to spatial memory safety violation
C/C++ do not define the result of a signed integer overflow, but
stipulate that unsigned integer wrap around when they overflow.
However, this wrap-around behavior is often unintended and
potentially dangerous.
Undefined behaviors such as signed integer overflows pose
additional security risks when compiler optimizations are
enabled. In the presence of potential undefined behavior,
compilers are allowed to assume that the program will never
reach the conditions under which this undefined behavior is
triggered. The compiler can then generate optimized program
code based on this assumption [22]. Consequently, the compiler
does not have to statically verify that the program is free
of potential undefined behavior, and the compiler does not
need to generate code that is capable of recognizing and
mitigating undefined behavior. The problem with this rationale
is that optimizations based on the assumption that the program
is free from undefined behavior can sometimes lead the
compiler to omit security checks. In CVE-2009-1897, for
example, GCC infamously omitted a null pointer check from
one of the Linux kernel drivers, which led to a privilege
escalation vulnerability [23]. Compiler developers regularly
add such aggressive optimizations to their compilers. Some
people therefore refer to potential undefined behavior as time
bombs [24].
struct sock *sk = tun->sk; // Compiler assumes tun is not
// a null pointer
if (!tun) // Check is optimized out
return POLLERR;
Listing 7. Simplified version of CVE-2009-1897; dereferencing a pointer lets
the compiler safely assume that the pointer is non-null
III. BUG FINDING TECHNIQUES
We now review the relevant bug finding techniques. We
begin each subsection with an informal description of the bug
finding policy, followed by a description of mechanisms that
implement (or approximate) that policy.
A. Memory Safety Violations
Memory safety bug finding tools detect dereferences of
pointers that either do not target their intended referent (i.e.,
spatial safety violations), or that target a referent that is no
longer valid (i.e., temporal safety violations). There are two
types of tools for detecting these bugs. We summarize their
high-level goals and properties here, and then proceed with an
in-depth discussion of the techniques these tools can employ
to detect memory safety bugs.
Location-based Access Checkers: Location-based access
checkers detect memory accesses to invalid memory regions.
These checkers have a metadata store that maintains state for
each byte of (a portion) of the addressable address space, and
consult this metadata store whenever the program attempts
to access memory to determine whether the memory access
is valid or not. Location-based access checkers can use red-
zone insertion [25]–[29] or guard pages [30], [31] to detect
spatial safety violations. Either of these techniques can be
combined with memory-reuse delay to additionally detect
temporal safety violations [25]–[27], [29]–[34]. Location-based
access checkers incur low run-time performance overheads,
and are highly compatible with non-instrumented code. The
downside is that these tools are imprecise, as they can only
detect if an instruction accesses valid memory, but not if
the accessed memory is part of the intended referent of the
instruction. These tools generally incur high memory overhead.
Identity-based Access Checkers: Identity-based access
checkers detect memory accesses that do not target their
intended referent. These tools maintain metadata (e.g., bounds
or allocation status) for each allocated memory object, and
have a mechanism in place to determine the intended referent
for every pointer in the program. Metadata lookups can
happen when the program calculates a new pointer using
arithmetic operations to determine if the calculation yields
a valid pointer and/or upon pointer dereferences to determine
if the dereference accesses the intended referent of the pointer.
Identity-based access checkers can use per-object bounds
tracking [32], [35]–[41] or per-pointer bounds tracking [42]–
[51] to detect spatial safety violations, and can be extended
with lock-and-key checking [44], [45], [52] or with dangling
pointer tagging [53]–[56] to detect temporal safety violations.
Identity-based checkers are more precise than location-based
access checkers, as they cannot just detect accesses to invalid
memory, but also accesses to valid memory outside of the
intended referent. These tools do, however, incur higher
run-time performance overhead than location-based checkers.
Identity-based checkers are generally not compatible with
non-instrumented code. They also have higher false positive
detection rates than location-based checkers.
1) Spatial Memory Safety Violations:
Red-zone Insertion: Location-based access checkers can
insert so-called red-zones between memory objects [25]–[29].
These red-zones represent out-of-bounds memory and are
marked as invalid memory in the metadata store. Memory
regions that are part of allocated memory pages, but that are
not part of any static or dynamic allocation in the program are
similarly considered to be red-zones and are therefore marked
as invalid in the metadata store. Any access to a red-zone or
to an unallocated memory region triggers a warning. Purify
was the first tool to employ this technique [25]. Purify inserts
the red-zones at the beginning and the end of each allocation.
Purify tracks the state of the program’s allocated address space
using a large shadow memory bitmap that stores two bits
of state per byte of memory. Valgrind’s Memcheck uses the
same technique but reserves two bits of state for every bit
of memory [26]. Consequently, Memcheck can detect access
errors with bit-level precision, rather than byte-level precision.
Light-weight Bounds Checking (LBC) similarly inserts red-
zones, but adds a fast path to the location-based access checks
to reduce the overhead of the metadata lookups [28]. LBC
does this by filling the red-zones with a random pattern and
assumes compares the data read/overwritten by every memory
access with the fill pattern. If the data does not match the fill
pattern, the access is considered safe because it could not have
targeted a red-zone. If the data does happen to match the fill
pattern, LBC performs a secondary slow path check that looks
up the state of the accessed data in the metadata store, and
triggers a warning if the accessed data is a red-zone.
Location-based access checkers that use red-zone insertion
generally incur low run-time performance overhead, but have
limited precision as they can only detect illegal accesses that
target a red-zone. Illegal accesses that target a valid object,
which may or may not be part of the same allocation as the
intended referent, cannot be detected. Red-zone insertion-based
tools also fail to detect intra-object overflow bugs because they
do not insert red-zones between subobjects. While technically
feasible, inserting red-zones between subobjects would lead to
excessive memory overhead and it would change the layout
of the parent object. Any code that accesses the parent object
or one of its subobjects would therefore have to be modified,
which would also break compatibility with external code that
is not aware of the altered data layout.
Guard Pages: Location-based access checkers can insert
inaccessible guard pages before and/or after every allocated
memory object [30], [31]. Out-of-bound reads and writes
that access a guard page trigger a page fault, which in turn
triggers an exception in the application. This use of the paging
hardware to detect illegal accesses allows location-based access
checkers to run without instrumenting individual load and
store instructions. Using guard pages does, however, incur
high memory overhead, making the technique impractical for
applications with large working sets. Microsoft recognized this
problem and added an option to surround memory objects with
guard blocks instead of full guard pages in PageHeap [31].
PageHeap fills these guard blocks with a fill pattern, and verifies
that the pattern is still present when a memory object is freed.
This technique is strictly inferior to red-zone insertion, as it
only detects out-of-bounds writes (and not reads), and it does
not detect the illegal writes until the overwritten object is freed.
Per-pointer Bounds Tracking: Identity-based access
checkers can store bounds metadata for every pointer [42]–[51].
Whenever the program creates a pointer by calling malloc
or by taking the address of an object, the tracker stores
the base and size of the referent as metadata for the new
pointer. The tracker propagates this metadata when the program
calculates new pointers through arithmetic and/or assignment
operations. Systems such as Bcc [42] instrument array accesses
and output a warning if the program reads or writes outside the
bounds of an array. Subsequent tools such as Safe-C [44] and
SoftBound [46] instrument all pointer dereferences and warn
when a pointer is outside the bounds of its intended referent
when the program attempts to dereference it.
Identity-based access checkers that use per-pointer bounds
tracking can provide complete spatial memory violation de-
tection, including detection of intra-object overflows. Soft-
Bound [46] and Intel Pointer Checker [47] detect intra-object
overflows by narrowing the pointer bounds to the bounds
of the subobject whenever the program derives a pointer
from the address of a subobject (i.e., a struct field). The
primary disadvantage of per-pointer bounds tracking is poor
compatibility, as the program generally cannot pass pointers
to non-instrumented libraries because such libraries do not
propagate or update bounds information correctly. Another
disadvantage is that per-pointer metadata propagation adds
high run-time overheads. CCured reduces this overhead by
identifying “safe” pointers, which can be excluded from
bounds checking and metadata propagation [48]. However,
even with such optimizations, per-pointer bounds checking
remains expensive without hardware support [57].
Per-object Bounds Tracking: Identity-based access
checkers can also store bounds metadata for every memory
object, rather than for every pointer [32], [35]–[41].
This approach—pioneered by Jones and Kelly (J&K)—
solves some of the compatibility issues associated with per-
pointer bounds tracking [32]. Per-object bounds trackers
can maintain bounds metadata without instrumenting pointer
creation and assignment operations. The tracker only needs
to intercept calls to memory allocation (i.e., malloc) and
deallocation (i.e., free) functions, which is possible even
in programs that are not fully instrumented. Since bounds
metadata is maintained only for objects and not for pointers, it
is difficult to link pointers to their intended referent. While the
intended referent of an in-bounds pointer can be found using
a range-based lookup in the metadata store, such a lookup
would not return the correct metadata for an out-of-bounds
(OOB) pointer. J&K therefore proposed to instrument pointer
arithmetic operations, and to invalidate pointers as they go
out-of-bounds (OOB). Any subsequent dereference triggers a
fault, which can then be caught to output a warning.
J&K’s approach, however, does not allow OOB pointers to
be converted back into in-bounds pointers. CRED does allow
such conversions if the resulting pointer points back at the
original referent [35]. To do so, CRED links OOB pointers to
so-called OOB objects which store the address of the original
referent of the OOB pointer.
Baggy Bounds Checking (BBC) eliminates the need to
allocate dedicated OOB objects by storing the distance between
the OOB pointer and its referent into the pointer’s most
significant bits [37]. Tagging the most significant bits also
turns OOB pointers into invalid user-space pointers, such that
dereferencing them causes a fault. BBC compresses the size
of the per-object metadata by rounding up all allocation sizes
to the nearest power of two, such that one byte of metadata
suffices to store the bounds.
Low-fat pointer (LFP) bounds checkers improve BBC by
embedding the allocation size in the pointer representation
without turning them into invalid user-space pointers [40], [41].
Pointers can therefore be passed to non-instrumented code
which does not know how to remove the tag. The idea behind
LFP is to partition the heap into equally-sized subheaps that
each supports only one allocation size. Thus, the allocation
size for any given pointer can be obtained by looking up the
allocation size supported by that heap. The base address can
be calculated by rounding it down to the allocation size. LFP
allows pointers to go OOB and to be converted back into in-
bounds pointers only if the OOB pointer does not escape the
current context. To ensure that all escaping pointers are within
bounds, LFP inserts a bounds check for pointer arithmetic
whose resulting pointer can be passed to a different context.
Per-object bounds trackers can support near-complete spatial
safety vulnerability detection. Allocator-based techniques such
as BBC and LFP, however, do sacrifice precision for better
run-time performance as they check allocation bounds rather
than object bounds (cf. Section VII-B).
Per-object bounds tracking has other downsides too. First,
per-object bounds trackers do not detect intra-object overflows
(cf. Section VII-B). Second, marking pointers as OOB by
pointing them to an OOB object, or by writing tags into their
upper bits might impact compatibility with external code that is
unaware of the bounds checking scheme used in the program.
Specifically, external code is unable to restore OOB pointers
into in-bounds pointers even when that is the intent.
2) Temporal Memory Safety Violations:
Memory-reuse Delay: Location-based access checkers
can mark recently deallocated objects as invalid in the metadata
store by replacing them with red-zones [25]–[27], [29], [32] or
with guard pages [30], [31], [33], [34]. The existing location-
based checking mechanism can then detect dangling pointer
dereferences as long as the deallocated memory is not reused.
If the program does reuse deallocated memory to allocate new
objects, this approach will erroneously allow dangling pointer
dereferences to proceed. Some memory-reuse delay-based tools
reduce the chance of such detection failures by delaying the
reuse of recently deallocated memory regions until they have
“aged” [25]–[27], [29], [32]. This leads to a trade-off between
precision and memory overhead as longer reuse delays lead
to higher memory overhead, but also to a higher chance of
detecting dangling pointer dereferences.
Dhurjati and Adve (D&A) proposed to use static analysis
to determine exactly when deallocated memory is safe to
reuse [33]. D&A allocate every memory object on its own
virtual memory page, but allow objects to share physical
memory pages. This is possible by aliasing virtual memory
pages to the same physical page. When the program frees a
memory object, D&A convert its virtual page into a guard page.
D&A also partition the heap into pools, leveraging a static
analysis called Automatic Pool Allocation [58]. This analysis
can infer when a pool is no longer accessible (even through
potentially dangling pointers), at which point all virtual pages
in the pool can be reclaimed. Dang et al. proposed a similar
system that does not use pool allocation, and can therefore be
applied to source-less programs [34]. Similar to D&A, Dang
et al. allocate all memory objects on their own virtual pages.
Upon deallocation of an object, Dang et al. unmap that object’s
virtual page. This effectively achieves the same goal as guard
pages, but allows the kernel to free additional page table entries,
which reduces the physical memory overhead. To prevent reuse
of unmapped virtual pages, Dang et al. propose to map new
pages at the high water mark (i.e., the highest virtual address
that has been used in the program). While this does not rule
out reuse of unmapped virtual pages completely, the idea is
that reuse is unlikely to happen given a 64-bit address space.
Lock-and-key: Identity-based checkers can detect tempo-
ral safety violations by assigning unique allocation identifiers—
often called keys—to every allocated memory object and by
storing this key in a lock location [44], [45], [52]. They also
store the lock location and the expected key as metadata for
every pointer. The checker revokes the key from the lock
location when its associated object is deallocated. Lock-and-
key checking detects temporal memory safety violations when
the program dereferences a pointer whose key does not match
the key stored in the lock location for that pointer. Assuming
unique keys, this approach provides complete coverage of
temporal safety violations [52]. Since this technique stores
per-pointer metadata, it naturally complements identity-based
checkers that also detect spatial violations using per-pointer
bounds tracking. The drawbacks of lock-and-key checking
are largely the same as those for per-pointer bounds tracking:
compatibility with non-instrumented code is poor because non-
instrumented code will not propagate the metadata correctly,
and the run-time overhead is significant because maintaining
metadata for every pointer is expensive.
Dangling Pointer Tagging: The most straightforward way
to tag dangling pointers is to nullify either the value or the
bounds associated with pointers that are passed to the free
function [47]. A spatial memory safety violation detection
mechanism would then trigger a warning if such pointers are
dereferenced at a later point in time. The disadvantage of this
approach is that it does not tag copies of the dangling pointer,
which may also be used in an unsafe way.
Several tools tag not only the pointer passed to free, but also
copies of that pointer by maintaining auxiliary data structures
that link all memory objects to any pointers that refer to
them [53]–[56]. Undangle uses taint tracking [59]–[61] to track
pointer creations, and to maintain an object-to-pointer map [53].
Whenever the program deallocates a memory object, Undangle
can query this pointer map to quickly find all dangling pointers
to the now deallocated object. Undangle aims to report not
only the use but also the existence of dangling pointers. It has a
configurable time window where it considers dangling pointers
latent but not unsafe, e.g., a transient dangling pointer that
appears during the deallocation of nested objects. Undangle
reports a dangling pointer when this window expires, or earlier
if the program attempts to dereference the pointer.
DangNull [54], FreeSentry [55], and DangSan [56] steer clear
of taint tracking and instrument all pointer creations at compile
time instead. These tools maintain pointer maps by calling a
runtime registration function whenever the program assigns a
pointer. Whenever the program deallocates a memory object,
the tools look up all pointers that point to the object being
deallocated, and invalidate them. Subsequent dereferences of
an invalidated dangling pointer result in a hardware trap.
Dangling pointer tagging tools that are not based on taint
tracking have some fundamental limitations. First, they require
the availability of source as it relies on precise type information
to determine which operations store new pointers. Second,
they fail to maintain accurate metadata if the program copies
pointers in a type-unsafe manner (e.g., by casting them to
integers). Third, and most importantly, they can only link
objects to pointers stored in memory, and is therefore unaware
of dangling pointers stored in registers. Taint tracking-based
tools such as Undangle, have none of these disadvantages, but
incur significant performance and memory overheads.
B. Use of Uninitialized Variables
These tools detect uses of uninitialized values.
Uninitialized Memory Read Detection: Location-based
access checkers can be extended to detect reads of uninitialized
memory values by marking all memory regions occupied
by newly allocated objects as uninitialized in the metadata
store [25]. These tools instrument read instructions to trigger
a warning if they read from uninitialized memory regions,
and they instrument writes to clear the uninitialized flag for
the overwritten region. Note that marking memory regions as
uninitialized is not equivalent to marking them as a red-zone,
since both read and write accesses to red-zones should trigger
a warning, whereas accesses to uninitialized memory should
only be disallowed for reads.
Uninitialized Value Use Detection: Detecting reads of
uninitialized memory yields many false positive detections,
as the C++14 standard explicitly allows uninitialized values
to propagate through the program as long as they are not
used. This happens, for example, when copying a partially
uninitialized struct from one location to the other. Memcheck
attempts to detect only the uses of uninitialized values by
limiting error reporting to (i) dereferences of pointers that are
(partially) undefined, (ii) branching on a (partially) undefined
value, (iii) passing undefined values to system calls, and (iv)
copying uninitialized values into floating point registers [26]. To
support this policy, Memcheck adds one byte of shadow state
for every partially initialized byte in the program memory.
This allows Memcheck to track the definedness of all of
the program’s memory with bit-level precision. Memcheck
approximates the C++14 semantics but produces false negatives
(failing to report illegitimate uses of uninitialized memory)
and false positives (reporting legitimate uses of uninitialized
memory), which are unavoidable given that Memcheck op-
erates at the binary level, rather than the source code level.
MemorySanitizer (MSan) implements fundamentally the same
policy as Memcheck, but instruments programs at the compiler
Intermediate Representation (IR) level [62]. The IR code carries
more information than binary code, which makes MSan more
precise than Memcheck. MSan produces no false positives
(provided that the entire program is instrumented) and few
false negatives. Its performance overhead is also an order of
magnitude lower than Memcheck.
C. Pointer Type Errors
These tools detect bad-casting or dereferencing of pointers
of incompatible types.
Pointer Casting Monitor: Pointer casting monitors detect
illegal downcasts through the C++ static_cast operator.
Illegal downcasts occur when the target type of the cast is not
equal to the run-time type (or one of its ancestor types) of the
source object. UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer [63] (UBSan) and
Clang CFI [64] include checkers that verify the correctness of
static_cast operations by comparing the target type to the
run-time type information (RTTI) associated with the source
object. This effectively turns static_cast operations into
dynamic_cast. The downside is that RTTI-based tools cannot
verify casts between non-polymorphic types that lack RTTI.
CaVer [65] and TypeSan [66] do not rely on RTTI to track
type information, but instead maintain custom metadata for all
types and all objects used in the program. This way, they can
extend the type-checking coverage to non-polymorphic types.
At compile time, these tools build per-class type metadata
tables which contain all the valid type casts for a given
pointer type. The type tables encode the class inheritance
relationships and information on how classes with multiple
base classes are composed (i.e., at which offset within objects
of a derived class is each base object located). Both tools
also track the effective run-time types for each live object by
monitoring memory allocations and storing the allocated types
in a metadata store. To perform downcast checking, the tools
retrieve the run-time type of the source object from the metadata
store, and then query the type table for the corresponding class
to check if the type conversion is in the table (and is therefore
permissible). HexType similarly tracks type information in
disjoint metadata structures, but provides a more accurate
run-time type tracing [67]. HexType also replaces the default
implementation of dynamic_cast with its own optimized
implementation, while preserving its run-time semantics, i.e.,
returning NULL for failing casts.
Pointer Use Monitor: C/C++ support several constructs
to convert types in potentially dangerous ways; C-style casts,
reinterpret_cast, and unions can all be used to bypass
compile-time type checking. Extending pointer casting monitor-
ing to all three of these constructs can result in false positives,
however, as type confusion bugs can only be exploited if a
pointer with the wrong type gets dereferenced. For this reason,
one might opt for pointer dereference/use monitoring over
pointer casting monitoring.
Loginov et al. proposed a pointer use monitor for C
programs [68]. The tool maintains and verifies run-time type
tags for each memory location by monitoring load and store
operations. A tag contains the scalar type that was last used to
write to its corresponding memory location. Aggregate types are
supported by breaking them down into their scalar components.
The tool stores the tags in shadow memory. Whenever a value
is read from memory, the tool checks if the type used to
load the value matches the type tag. A more recent pointer
use monitor is TypeSanitizer (TySan) [69], which is being
integrated into the LLVM project as of this writing. TySan
leverages type information generated by the compiler frontend
(clang) to maintain a type tag store in shadow memory, and
to verify the correctness of load instructions. Contrary to
Loginov et al.’s tool, however, TySan does not require that
the types used to store and load from a memory location
match exactly. Instead, TySan only requires type compatibility,
as defined by the aliasing rule in the C/C++ standard. For
example, TySan allows all loads through a character pointer
type, even if the target location was stored using a pointer
to a larger type. Loginov et al.’s tool would detect this as an
error, but this behavior is explicitly permitted by the language
standard. TySan also differs from Loginov et al.’s tool in that
it checks struct types at a finer granularity. Loginov et al.
build type tags for structs by fully decomposing them into
their scalar components. struct A{int a;}; and struct
A{struct B{int a;} b;}; would therefore get the same
type tag. TySan, by contrast, is struct path-aware and can
distinguish these two types.
Several tools also detect pointer type errors in indirect
function calls, that is, calling functions through a pointer of a
type incompatible with the type of the callee [63], [64], [70].
Function-signature-based forward-edge control flow integrity
mechanisms such as Clang CFI [64] can be viewed as sanitizers
that detect such function pointer misuses. Since all the function
signatures are known at compile-time, these tools can detect
mismatches between the pointer type and the function type
without maintaining run-time tags.
D. Variadic Function Misuse
These tools detect memory safety violations and uninitialized
variable uses specific to variadic functions.
Dangerous Format String Detection: The most promi-
nent class of variadic function misuse bugs are format string
vulnerabilities. Most efforts therefore focus solely on detection
of dangerous calls to printf. Among these efforts are tools
that restrict the usage of the %n qualifier in the format
string [71], [72]. This qualifier may be used to have printf
write to a caller-specified location in memory. However, this
dangerous operation [2] is specific to the printf function, so
the aforementioned tools’ applicability is limited.
Argument Mismatch Detection: FormatGuard prevents
printf from reading more arguments than were passed by the
caller [73]. FormatGuard does this by redirecting the calls to
a protected printf implementation that increments a counter
whenever it retrieves a variadic argument through va_arg. If
the counter surpasses the number of arguments specified at the
call site, FormatGuard raises an alert. HexVASAN generalizes
argument counting to all variadic functions, and also adds type
checking [74]. HexVASAN instruments the call sites of variadic
functions to capture the number and types of arguments passed
to the callee and saves this information in a metadata store. The
tool then instruments va_start and va_copy operations to
retrieve information from the metadata store, and it instruments
va_arg operations to check if the argument being accessed is
within the given number of arguments and of the given type.
E. Other Vulnerabilities
These tools detect other undefined behavior or dangerous
well-defined but potentially unintended behavior.
Stateless Monitoring: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer (UB-
San) is [63], to our knowledge, the only dynamic tool that
detects any of the types of undefined behavior we have
not covered so far. The undefined behaviors UBSan detects
currently include signed integer overflows, floating point or
integer division by zero, invalid bitwise shift operations, floating
point overflows caused by casting (e.g., casting a large double-
precision floating point number to a single-precision float), uses
of misaligned pointers, performing an arithmetic operation that
overflows a pointer, dereferencing a null pointer, and reaching
the end of a value-returning function without returning a value.
Most of UBSan’s detection features are stateless, so they
can be turned on collectively without interfering with each
other. UBSan can also detect several kinds of well-defined
but likely unintended behavior. For example, the language
standard dictates that unsigned integers have their value reset
to zero when they overflow. This well-defined behavior is often
unexpected and a frequent source of bugs, however, so UBSan
can optionally detect these unsigned integer wraparounds.
IV. PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION
Sanitizers implement their bug finding policy by embedding
inlined reference monitors (IRMs) into the program. These
IRMs monitor and mediate all program instructions that can
contribute to a vulnerability. Such instructions include (but
are not limited to) memory loads and stores, stack frame
(de)allocations, calls to memory allocation functions (e.g.,
malloc), and system calls. IRMs can be embedded using
a compiler, linker, or an instrumentation framework.
A. Language-level Instrumentation
Sanitizers can be embedded at the source code or abstract
syntax tree (AST) level. The source code and AST are language-
specific and typically contain full type information, language-
specific syntax, and compile time-evaluated expressions such
as const_cast and static_cast type conversions. This
language-specific information is typically discarded when the
compiler lowers the AST into Intermediate Representation (IR)
code. Language-level instrumentation is recommended (or even
necessary) for sanitizers that detect pointer type errors through
pointer cast monitoring.
An additional advantage of instrumenting at the language
level is that the compiler preserves the full semantics of
the program throughout the early stages of the compilation.
The sanitizer can therefore see the semantics intended by the
programmer. At later stages in the compilation, the compiler
may assume that the program contains no undefined behavior,
and it may optimize the code based on this assumption (e.g.,
by eliminating seemingly unnecessary security checks). The
disadvantage of instrumenting at the language level is that
the entire source code of the application must be available
and the code must be written in the expected language. Thus,
this approach does not work for applications that link against
closed-source libraries, nor does it work for applications that
contain inline assembly code.
B. IR-level Instrumentation
Sanitizers can also be embedded later stage in the compila-
tion, when the AST has been lowered into IR code. Compiler
backends such as LLVM support IR-level instrumentation [75].
This approach is more generic than source-level transformation
in that the compiler IR is (mostly) independent of the source
language. Thus, by instrumenting at this level, the sanitizer can
automatically support multiple source languages. An additional
advantage is that the compiler backend implements various
static analyses and optimization passes that can be used by the
sanitizer. Sanitizers can leverage this infrastructure to optimize
the IRMs they embed into the program (e.g., by removing
redundant or provably safe checks).
The disadvantage of IR-level instrumentation is largely
similar to that of language-level instrumentation, i.e., the lack
of support for closed-source libraries and inline assembly
code (Section IV-A). Exceptionally, ASan does provide limited
support for inline x86 assembly code at the IR level because
it includes a pass that is dedicated to parsing and instrument-
ing MOV and MOVAPS instructions found in inline assembly
blocks [29]. Manual assembly parsers are architecture-specific,
however, and need to be reimplemented or duplicated for every
supported architecture.
C. Binary Instrumentation
Dynamic binary translation (DBT) frameworks allow in-
strumentation of a program at run time [76]–[78]. They read
program code, instrument it, and translate it to machine code
while the program executes and expose various hooks to
influence execution. The main advantage of DBT-based tools
over compiler-based tools is that they work well for closed-
source programs. Moreover, DBT frameworks offer complete
instrumentation coverage of user-mode code regardless of its
origin. DBT frameworks can instrument the program itself,
third party code (that may be dynamically loaded), and even
dynamically generated code.
The main disadvantage of DBT is the (much) higher run-
time performance overhead compared to static instrumentation
tools (see Section VII-E). This overhead can be primarily
attributed to run-time decoding and translation of instructions.
This problem can be partially addressed by instrumenting
binaries statically using a Static Binary Instrumentation (SBI)
framework. However, both SBI and DBT-based sanitizers must
operate on binaries that contain virtually no type information
or language-specific syntax. It is therefore impossible to embed
a pointer type error sanitizer at this stage. Information about
stack frame and global data section layouts is also lost at the
binary level, which makes it impossible to insert a fully precise
spatial memory safety sanitizer using binary instrumentation.
D. Library Interposition
An alternative, albeit very coarse-grained, method is to
intercept calls to library functions using library interposers [79].
A library interposer is a shared library that, when preloaded
into a program [80], can intercept, monitor, and manipulate all
inter-library function calls in the program. Some sanitizers use
this method to intercept calls to memory allocation functions
such as malloc and free.
The advantage of this approach is that, similarly to DBT-
based instrumentation, it works well for COTS binaries in
that no source or object code is required. Contrary to DBT,
however, library interposition incurs virtually no overhead. One
disadvantage is that library interposition only works for inter-
library calls. A call between two functions in the same library
cannot be intercepted. Another disadvantage is that library
interposition is highly platform and target-specific. A sanitizer
that uses library interposition to intercept calls to malloc
would not work for programs that have their own memory
allocator, for example.
V. METADATA MANAGEMENT
One important aspect of a sanitizer design is how it stores and
looks up metadata. This metadata typically captures information
about the state of pointers or memory objects used in the
program. Although run-time performance is not a primary
concern for sanitizer developers or users, the sheer quantity
of metadata most sanitizers store means that even small
inefficiencies in the storage scheme can make the sanitizer
unacceptably slow. The metadata storage scheme also by
and large determines whether two sanitizers can be used in
conjunction. If two independent sanitizers both use a metadata
scheme that changes the pointer and/or object representation
in the program, they often cannot be used together.
A. Object Metadata
Some sanitizers use object metadata storage schemes to
store state for all allocated memory objects. This state may
include the object size, type, state (e.g., allocated/deallocated,
initialized/uninitialized), allocation identifier, etc.
Embedded Metadata: An obvious way to store metadata
for an object is to increase its allocation size and to append or
prepend the metadata to the object’s data. This mechanism is
popular among modern memory allocators which, for example,
store the length of a buffer in front of the actual buffer. Tools
can modify memory allocators to transparently reserve memory
for metadata in addition to the requested buffer size, and
then return a pointer into the middle of this allocation so
that the metadata is invisible to clients. Allocation-embedded
metadata is used in ASan [29] and Oscar [34], among others.
ASan embeds information about the allocation context in each
allocated object. Oscar stores each object’s canonical address
as embedded metadata.
Direct-mapped Shadow: The direct-mapped shadow
scheme maps every block of n bytes in the application’s
memory to a block of m bytes of metadata via the formula:
// shadow_base is the base address of the metadata store
// block_addr is the address of the memory block
metadata_addr = shadow_base + m * (block_addr / n)
ASan [29], for example, stores 1 byte of metadata for every 8
bytes of application memory. In this case, the shadow mapping
formula can be simplified to:
metadata_addr = shadow_base + (block_addr >> 3)
The direct-mapped shadow scheme is easy to implement
and insert into an application. It is generally also very efficient
since only one memory read is needed to retrieve the metadata
for any given object. There are cases where it can lead to poor
run-time performance too, however, as it can worsen memory
fragmentation (and thus spatial locality) in already fragmented
address spaces. It is also wasteful in terms of allocated memory,
since the shadow memory area is contiguous and must be big
enough to mirror all allocated memory blocks (from the lowest
virtual addresses to the highest).
Multi-level Shadow: The multi-level shadow scheme can
reduce the memory footprint of metadata store by introducing
additional layers of indirection in the form of directory tables.
These directory tables can store pointers to metadata tables
or other directory tables. Each metadata table directly mirrors
a portion of the application memory, similar to the direct-
mapped shadow scheme. As a whole, the multi-level shadow
scheme resembles how modern operating systems implement
page tables. Having additional layers of indirection allows
metadata stores to allocate metadata tables on-demand. They
only have to allocate the directory tables themselves, and can
defer allocation of the metadata tables until they are needed.
This is particularly useful for systems that have limited address
space (e.g., 32-bit systems), where sanitizers that implement
direct-mapped shadow schemes (e.g., ASan [29]) often exhaust
the available address space and cause program termination.
Tools that require per-object metadata (in contrast to per-
byte metadata) can use a variable-compression-ratio multi-
level shadow mapping scheme, where the directory table maps
variable-sized objects to constant-sized metadata. This scheme
can help the tools to optimize their shadow memory usage and
allocation-time performance [81].
The main characteristic of this scheme is that each metadata
access requires multiple memory accesses: one for each level of
directory tables and another one for the corresponding metadata
table. This significantly affects performance, especially for tools
that frequently look up metadata, e.g., a bounds checking tool
which requires metadata access for most memory accesses.
TypeSan [66], for example, is a good fit for the two-level
variable-compression-ratio scheme, as the type metadata is per-
object and constant-sized and metadata lookup is infrequent.
Custom Data Structure: In addition to variations of the
previously presented metadata schemes, some tool authors have
opted for a range of custom data structures and tool-specific
solutions to store metadata. Bounds checkers such as J&K,
CRED, and D&A employ splay trees [32], [35], [36]. UBSan
and CaVer use an additional hash table as a cache to store
the most recent results of type checking. DangNull utilizes a
thread-safe red-black tree to encode the relationship between
objects [54]. Note that, when using a data structure without
support for concurrent access it must be protected by explicit
locks in a multi-threaded setting. For thread-local or stack
variables, per-thread metadata is also a choice, e.g., CaVer’s
per-thread red-black tree for stack and global objects.
B. Pointer Metadata
Fat Pointers: Some sanitizers replace standard machine
pointers with fat pointers. Fat pointers are structures that contain
the original pointer value, as well as metadata associated with
the original pointer. A fairly straightforward fat pointer layout,
used in many per-pointer bounds tracking tools is:
struct fat_pointer {
void* value; // Original pointer value
void* base; // Base address of the intended referent
size_t size; // Size of the referent
};
The primary advantage of using fat pointers is that they do
not add much additional cache pressure compared to regular
pointers, and that they can store an arbitrary amount of metadata.
The disadvantages are that they require extensive instrumenta-
tion of the program, they change the calling conventions for
functions that accept pointer arguments (fat pointers occupy
more than one register when passed as a function argument),
and that they cannot be used in programs that interact with
non-instrumented third-party libraries. Without instrumentation,
these libraries do not interpret the fat pointer correctly, nor are
they able to update the fat pointer when its embedded inner
pointer value changes.
Tagged Pointers: A less invasive way to store per-pointer
metadata is to replace regular machine pointers with tagged
pointers. A tagged pointer embeds metadata in the pointer
itself, without changing its size. This technique provides better
compatibility than fat pointers. Passing tagged pointers as
function arguments does not require changes to the standard
calling conventions, for example. Another advantage is that
tagged pointers do not introduce any additional cache pressure
compared to regular machine pointers. The amount of infor-
mation that a tagged pointer can encode is limited by size of
the unused address space for a given target platform. Most
AMD64 platforms, including Linux/x86 64, for example, only
use the lowest 256TiB of virtual address space for user-mode
applications. The upper 16 bits of any valid user-mode pointer
are therefore guaranteed to be zero. These 16 bits can store
per-pointer metadata. Baggy Bounds Checking [37] uses the
spare bits to store the distance between an OOB pointer and
its intended referent. Note that tagged pointers usually cannot
be dereferenced directly. The metadata should be masked out
whenever a tagged pointer is dereferenced. This also means
that, similar to fat pointers, tagged pointers must be unpacked
if they escape to external non-instrumented libraries. This is
not true for low-fat pointer (LFP) bounds checkers, which store
the metadata implicitly in the tagged pointer value, and can
be dereferenced directly [40], [41].
Disjoint Metadata: Storing metadata in a disjoint meta-
data store instead of embedding it in the pointer representation
improves compatibility over the aforementioned approaches. In
contrast to per-object metadata, however, sanitizers usually do
not use direct-mapped shadow stores to maintain per-pointer
metadata (cf. Section V-A). The portion of memory occupied
by pointers is usually small and the size of pointer metadata
(e.g., bounds) tends to exceed the size of the pointer itself,
resulting in wasteful consumption of address space. For this
reason, even at the cost of additional memory accesses, tool
authors have favored multi-level structures for maintaining per-
pointer metadata. CETS [52] utilizes a two-level lookup trie
(similar to page tables) using the pointer location as the key
to store the allocation identifier and the lock address of the
referent. Intel Pointer Checker [47] and Intel MPX [82] also
use a two-level structure to maintain pointer bounds.
The main disadvantage of disjoint metadata compared to in-
pointer metadata is that the sanitizer must explicitly propagate
the metadata whenever the program copies a pointer to a new
memory location. If the program calls memcpy to copy a data
structure containing pointers, for example, then the sanitizer
must update the metadata store for the pointers in the target data
structure. With in-pointer metadata, by contrast, the metadata
always travels with the pointer.
C. Static Metadata
Some sanitizers require certain information discarded by the
compiler to perform their checks at run time. To make the
required compile-time information available at run time, these
sanitizers usually embed static metadata into the compiled
program. For example, bad-casting sanitizers create a type
hierarchy table at compile time to facilitate type casting checks
at run time. HexVASAN, a variadic function call sanitizer,
builds static metadata for each variadic call site to encode
the number of arguments and their types. At run time, the
instrumented caller pushes the static metadata onto a custom
stack, which is used by the callee to check the validity of the
supplied arguments.
VI. DRIVING A SANITIZER
Dynamic analysis tools, including sanitizers, only detect
bugs on code paths that execute during testing. Increasing path
coverage therefore increases bug finding opportunities. Program
execution can be driven by unit or integration test suites,
automated fuzzers, alpha and beta testers, or any combination
thereof.
Unit testing and integration testing are already best practices
in software engineering. Writing these tests has traditionally
been a manual process. While indispensable in general, using
hand-written tests does have some drawbacks when used to
sanitize a program. First, manually written tests often focus on
positive testing using valid inputs to check expected behavior.
Security bugs are typically exploited by feeding the program
invalid inputs, however. Second, manually written tests hardly
ever cover all code paths. Developers can use automated test
case generators to alleviate this problem [6], [7], [83], [84],
but this option is generally only available when the full source
code is available.
A second option is to run a fuzzer on the program being
sanitized [85]–[90]. Fuzzers are testing tools that run programs
on automatically generated inputs. The main advantages of
fuzzers are that (i) they perform negative testing, because they
tend to provide invalid inputs to the program and (ii) they can
run automatically once integrated into a project. Fuzzers can
find security bugs relatively quickly, especially if the bugs are
triggered on code paths that are easily accessible.
A third option to find security bugs is to ship sanitization-
enabled programs to beta testers and to collect and transmit
any sanitizer output back to the developer. The main advantage
here is that beta testers can distribute the testing load, therefore
allowing developers to locate bugs more quickly. One disad-
vantage is that beta testers will inadvertently focus on testing
the program’s main usage scenarios. Another disadvantage is
that sanitizers can slow down the program so much that it
becomes unusable on consumer-grade machines, thus reducing
the chance that beta testers will thoroughly test the programs.
VII. ANALYSIS
Table II summarizes the features of sanitizers that are
either being actively maintained (as open source projects or
commercial products), or that were published at academic
conferences. Some of the tools we included were originally
designed as an exploit mitigation, and therefore do not have a
built-in error reporting mechanism. However, these tools do
fit our definition of a sanitizer (cf. Section I-A) as they can
pinpoint the exact location of the vulnerable code, and they can
provide useful feedback if used in conjunction with a debugger.
We excluded Intel Inspector XE [91], ParaSoft Insure++ [70],
Micro Focus DevPartner Studio [92], and UNICOM Global
PurifyPlus [93], because the lack of public information about
these sanitizers does not permit an accurate comparison.
For every sanitizer, the table shows which bugs it finds,
which techniques it uses to find those bugs, and which metadata
storage scheme (if any) it uses. The pie marks represent our
assessment of how effective the sanitizer is, and how efficient
it is in terms of run-time and memory overheads. A colored
cell indicates that the sanitizer is known to produce false
positives. We discuss the reasons for these false positives in
Section VII-A. We verified the reported performance numbers
for 10 of these tools (i.e., those that have their performance
overhead cells in Table II marked with an asterisk) by running
them on the same experimental platform using the same set
of benchmarks. We report the exact performance numbers for
these tools in Appendix A.
A. False Positives
The practicality of a sanitizer primarily depends on how
accurately it reports bugs. A developer that uses a sanitizer
wants to minimize the time spent on reviewing its bug reports.
The most desirable property for a sanitizer is therefore that
it reports no false positives (i.e., all bugs it reports are truly
bugs), while false negatives (i.e., the sanitizer finds all possible
bugs) are a secondary concern. We identified the following
recurring problems that can lead to false positive detections.
The most frequently recurring problem is that sanitizers often
implement a bug finding policy or mechanism which is stricter
than either the language standard or the de facto standard.
The de facto standard includes widely-followed programming
practices that do not necessarily comply with the language
standard, even though they result in bug-free code [94]. One
could therefore argue that reporting behavior that does not
comply with the de facto standard as a bug constitutes a false
positive detection.
Older per-object bounds trackers such as J&K disallow the
creation of OOB pointers that point beyond the end of an
array [32]. This design decision is compatible with the language
standard, but not with the de facto standard. Creating OOB
pointers is common in real-world programs, and does not lead
to problems unless the program dereferences the OOB pointer.
Subsequent per-object bounds trackers such as CRED allow
programs to create OOB pointers.
Programs that store temporarily OOB pointers can also cause
problems for dangling pointer checkers [54]–[56]. These tools
do not recognize the intended referent of an OOB pointer and
therefore fail to register the pointer to the correct object. If the
intended referent gets deallocated, the dangling pointer checker
will not invalidate the OOB pointer. Worse, if the temporarily
OOB pointer happened to point to a valid object (different
from its intended referent) when it was registered, then the
pointer checker will erroneously invalidate the pointer when
the program deallocates that different object.
Pointers that temporarily go OOB can also cause problems
in low-fat pointer-based bounds checkers [40], [41], which
perform bounds checks whenever a pointer escapes from a
function. If an OOB pointer is passed to a function that converts
that pointer back to its original in-bounds value, the checker
will have raised a false positive warning.
Uninitialized memory read detectors raise warnings when
the program reads uninitialized memory. The language standard
allows this, as long as the uninitialized values are not used in
the program.
Some pointer type error checkers fail to capture the effective
type of an object under certain circumstances. For example,
if a memory region is repurposed using placement new in
C++, these checkers may fail to update or invalidate the type
metadata associated with that region. This can lead to false
positive detections when the old type is used for type checking.
Type checkers such as Loginov et al.’s pointer use mon-
itor [68] and HexVASAN [74] require that the source and
destination types are identical. The language standard’s aliasing
rule defines a set of permitted conversions between non-
identical types, however.
B. False Negatives
False negatives (i.e., failing to report bugs that are in scope)
happen due to discrepancies between the bug finding policy
and the mechanism that implements the policy. We identified
several bug finding mechanisms that do not fully cover all of
the bugs that are supposed to be covered by the policy.
Spatial safety violation detection mechanisms based on red-
zone insertion and guard pages only detect illegal accesses to
the red-zone or guard page directly adjacent to the intended
referent of that access. Memory accesses that target a valid
object beyond the red-zone or guard page are not detected.
These same mechanisms also fail to detect intra-object over-
flows because they do not insert red-zones or guard pages
between subobjects in the same parent object.
Spatial safety violation detectors that use tagged pointers
may round up the allocation sizes for newly allocated objects
to the nearest power of two [37], or to the nearest supported
allocation size [40], [41]. The bounds checks performed by
these detectors enforce allocation bounds, rather than object
Sanitizers III. Bug Finding Techniques IV. Instr. V. Metadata Mgmt. VII. Analysis
Y
ea
r
Pu
bl
is
he
d
A
ct
iv
el
y
M
ai
nt
ai
ne
d
R
ed
-z
on
e
In
se
rt
io
n
G
ua
rd
Pa
ge
s
M
em
or
y-
re
us
e
D
el
ay
Pe
r-
po
in
te
r
B
ou
nd
s
Tr
ac
ki
ng
Pe
r-
ob
je
ct
B
ou
nd
s
Tr
ac
ki
ng
L
oc
k-
an
d-
ke
y
D
an
gl
in
g
Po
in
te
r
Ta
gg
in
g
U
ni
ni
t.
M
em
.R
ea
d
D
et
ec
tio
n
U
ni
ni
t.
V
al
ue
U
se
D
et
ec
tio
n
Po
in
te
r
C
as
tin
g
M
on
ito
r
Po
in
te
r
U
se
M
on
ito
r
V
ar
ia
di
c
A
rg
.M
is
m
at
ch
D
et
ec
tio
n
St
at
el
es
s
M
on
ito
ri
ng
L
an
gu
ag
e-
le
ve
l
In
st
r.
IR
-l
ev
el
In
st
r.
B
in
ar
y
In
st
r.
L
ib
ra
ry
In
te
rp
os
iti
on
E
m
be
dd
ed
M
et
ad
at
a
D
ir
ec
t-
m
ap
pe
d
Sh
ad
ow
M
ul
ti-
le
ve
l
Sh
ad
ow
C
us
to
m
D
at
a
St
ru
ct
ur
e
Fa
t/T
ag
ge
d
Po
in
te
rs
D
is
jo
in
t
Pe
r-
po
in
te
r
M
et
ad
at
a
St
at
ic
M
et
ad
at
a
Sp
at
ia
l
Sa
fe
ty
V
io
la
tio
n
(I
I-
A
1)
Te
m
po
ra
l
Sa
fe
ty
V
io
la
tio
n
(I
I-
A
2)
U
se
of
U
ni
ni
t.
V
ar
ia
bl
es
(I
I-
B
)
B
ad
-c
as
tin
g
(I
I-
C
)
L
oa
d
Ty
pe
M
is
m
at
ch
(I
I-
C
)
Fu
nc
.C
al
l
Ty
pe
M
is
m
at
ch
(I
I-
C
)
V
ar
ia
di
c
Fu
nc
.M
is
us
e
(I
I-
D
)
Si
gn
ed
In
te
ge
r
O
ve
rfl
ow
(I
I-
E
)
O
th
er
U
nd
ef
.B
eh
av
io
r
(I
I-
E
)
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
O
ve
rh
ea
d
M
em
or
y
O
ve
rh
ea
d
Purify [25] ’91 4 4 4 4 4
Memcheck [26] ’05 4 4 4 4 4 4 [ n/a
Dr. Memory [27] ’11 4 4 4 4 4 4 n/a
LBC [28] ’12 4 4 4
ASan [29] ’12 4 4 4 4 4 [
Electric Fence [30] ’93 4 4 4 n/a
PageHeap [31] ’00 4 4 4 n/a
D&A Dangling [33] ’06 4 4 4 n/a
Oscar [34] ’17 4 4 4 4
RTCC [43] ’92 4 4 4 n/a
Safe-C [44] ’94 4 4 4 4 4
P&F [45] ’97 4 4 4 4
MSCC [50] ’04 4 4 4 4
SoftBound+CETS [46], [52] ’10 4 4 4 4
Intel Pointer Checker [47] ’12 4 4 4 4 4
J&K [32] ’97 4 4 4 n/a
CRED [35] ’04 4 4 4 n/a
D&A Bounds [36] ’06 4 4 4 n/a
BBC [37] ’09 4 4 4
PAriCheck [39] ’10 4 4 4 n/a
Low-fat Pointer [40], [41] ’17 4 4 4 [
Undangle [53] ’12 4 4 4
FreeSentry [55] ’15 4 4 4 4 n/a
DangNull [54] ’15 4 4 4
DangSan [56] ’17 4 4 4 4 [
MSan [62] ’15 4 4 4 4 [
CaVer [65] ’15 4 4 4 4 4
TypeSan [66] ’16 4 4 4 4 4 [
HexType [67] ’17 4 4 4 4 4 [
Loginov et al. [68] ’01 4 4 4 n/a
LLVM TySan [69] ’17 4 4 4 4 4 n/a
Clang CFI [64] ’15 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 [
HexVASAN [74] ’17 4 4 4 4 [
UBSan [63] ’12 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 [
TABLE II
OVERVIEW OF SANITIZERS
SPATIAL SAFETY VIOLATION
No stack/global var. overflow detection
No overflow to padding detection
No intra-object overflow detection
TEMPORAL SAFETY VIOLATION
Dangling pointer identified at compile-time
No protection for pointers to reused memory
or register-stored pointers
No protection for pointers to stack variables
or integer-typed pointers
USE OF UNINITIALIZED VARIABLES
Fair coverage
Good coverage
BAD-CASTING
Polymorphic class support only
Non-polymorphic class support
Better but incomplete run-time type tracing
LOAD TYPE MISMATCH
Scalar type granularity
Incomplete run-time type tracing
OTHER UNDEFINED BEHAVIOR
Partial coverage
Known false positives
PERFORMANCE OVERHEAD
Over 10x
Up to 10x
Up to 3x
Up to 10%
[Verified (see Appendix)
MEMORY OVERHEAD
Over 10x
3x to 10x
1x to 3x
n/a Data not available
bounds. Thus, if an illegal memory access targets the padding
added to an object, it will not be reported.
Per-object bounds tracking tools do not detect intra-object
overflows because they cannot (always) distinguish object
pointers from subobject pointers. This happens, e.g., when a
parent object has a subobject as its first member. This subobject
is located at the same memory address as the parent object.
Temporal safety violation detection mechanisms based
on location-based checking or guard pages cannot detect
dereferencing of dangling pointers whose target has been reused
for a new memory allocation. This problem can be mitigated
by delaying memory reuse for a limited time, or eliminated
if a pool allocation analysis can determine when deallocated
is no longer accessible [33]. Pool allocation analysis is only
available at compile time, when sufficient type information is
available, however.
Guard page-based temporal safety violation detectors cannot
invalidate local variables that have gone out of scope. These
local variables are stored in stack frames. These frames cannot
be replaced by guard pages because they usually share memory
pages with other frames that are still in use. Consequently,
guard page-based techniques cannot detect use-after-scope and
use-after-return vulnerabilities.
Temporal safety violation detectors based on dangling pointer
invalidation only invalidate pointers that are stored in memory.
Dangling pointers stored in registers are not invalidated, even
if the program eventually copies them into memory.
Most uninitialized memory use detectors approximate the
language standard by considering a value as “used” only in
limited circumstances, such as when it is passed to a system
call, or when it is used in a branch condition.
Pointer type error detectors such as TySan [69] also conser-
vatively approximate the effective type rules of the language
standard, thus failing to detect bugs involving objects of a type
unknown to their system.
Some sanitizers fail to recognize pointers that are cast to
integers or copied via memcpy. Identity-based access checkers
that use per-pointer metadata, for example, regularly fail
to propagate pointer bounds across these constructs. This
problem also affects sanitizers that tag dangling pointers
by instrumenting stores of pointer-typed variables, but miss
pointers temporarily cast to integers or copied in a type-unsafe
manner.
C. Incomplete Instrumentation
Sanitizers that instrument programs statically cannot fully
support programs that generate code at run time (e.g., just-in-
time compilers) or programs that interact with external libraries
that cannot be instrumented (e.g., because their source code
is not available). Some sanitizers that instrument programs at
the compiler IR level also do not support programs containing
inline assembly code because the compiler front-end does not
translate such code into compiler IR code. In all of these cases,
the sanitizer might fail to insert checks, potentially leading to
false negatives. For example, if a program accesses memory
from within a block of dynamically generated code, a spatial
safety violation sanitizer will generally not be able to verify
whether the memory access is legal.
Moreover, the sanitizer might also fail to emit the necessary
instructions to update metadata. This is particularly problematic
for sanitizers that need to propagate metadata explicitly (e.g.,
disjoint per-pointer metadata). For example, if a program copies
a pointer with disjoint metadata to a new memory location from
within an external non-instrumented library, then the sanitizer
will not copy the metadata for the source pointer. Without
proper metadata propagation, the sanitizer might generate false
negatives (because metadata might be missing from the store)
or false positives (because the metadata might be outdated).
These problems can be overcome by embedding the sanitizer
at run time instead, using a dynamic binary instrumentation
framework. These frameworks cannot provide accurate type
information, however, and consequently do not support certain
types of sanitizers (e.g., pointer casting monitors).
D. Thread Safety
Sanitizers that maintain metadata for pointers and objects
can incur both false positives and false negatives in multi-
threaded programs. This can happen because they might access
metadata structures in a thread-unsafe way, or because the
sanitizer does not guarantee that it updates the metadata in the
same transaction as program’s atomic updates to its associated
pointers or objects. The former problem affects FreeSentry [55]
and makes the sanitizer unable to support multi-threaded
programs. The latter problem affects Intel Pointer Checker [47],
and Intel MPX [82] among others. These sanitizers allow
pointers or objects to go out of sync with their metadata if
the program concurrently updates and accesses them outside
of critical sections. Some sanitizers such as Memcheck [26]
sidestep this issue by serializing the execution of multi-threaded
programs, thereby always atomically updating metadata along
with pointers and objects associated with it.
E. Performance Overhead
The run-time performance requirements for sanitizers are
not as stringent as those for exploit mitigations. While the
latter typically only see real-world deployment if their run-
time overhead stays below 5% [13], we observed that sanitizers
incurring less than 3x overhead are widely used in practice. In
some cases, such as when the source code for a program is not
(fully) available, or if the program generates code on-the-fly,
even larger overheads of up to 20x are acceptable. Yet, there
are good reasons to try to minimize a sanitizer’s overhead. One
reason in particular is that the faster a sanitizer becomes, the
faster a sanitization-enabled program can be fuzzed. This in
turn allows the fuzzer to explore more code paths before it
stops making meaningful progress (cf. Section VI).
The primary contributors to a sanitizer’s run-time overhead
are its checking, metadata storage and propagation, and run-
time instrumentation cost. The run-time instrumentation cost
is zero for most sanitizers, because they instrument programs
statically (at compile time). For sanitizers that use dynamic
binary instrumentation, however, the run-time instrumentation
cost can be very high. Valgrind’s Memcheck [26], for example,
incurs 25.7x overhead on the SPEC2000 benchmarks. 4.9x of
this run-time overhead can be attributed to Valgrind itself [78],
the DBT framework Memcheck is based on.
The metadata storage and propagation cost primarily depends
on the metadata storage scheme. In general, embedded metadata
and tagged or fat pointers are the most efficient storage schemes
because they cause less cache pressure than disjoint/shadow
metadata storage schemes. Embedded metadata and tagged/fat
pointers have the additional advantage that their metadata
automatically propagates when an object or pointer is copied.
Using tagged or fat pointers is problematic in programs that
cannot be fully instrumented, however (cf. Section V-B). The
one exception is low-fat pointer-based bounds tracking [40],
[41], where the metadata is stored implicitly in the tagged
pointer so that the tagged pointer can still be dereferenced
in non-instrumented libraries. In practice, we observe that
disjoint/shadow metadata storage schemes are preferred over
tagged and fat pointers, despite the fact that they cause more
cache pressure and require explicit metadata propagation when
objects or pointers are copied.
The checking cost is strongly correlated with the sanitizer’s
checking frequency, which, in turn, strongly depends on the
type of sanitizer. Since memory error detectors generally
require coverage of all memory accesses or pointer arithmetic
operations performed by a program, they introduce more
overhead than other tools such as type casting checkers that
monitor a smaller set of operations. Some memory error
detection tools provide selective instrumentation, e.g., to
monitor memory writes only, to achieve better performance at
the cost of reduced coverage.
F. Memory Overhead
Sanitizers that increase the allocation sizes for memory
objects, or that use disjoint or shadow metadata storage schemes
have sizable memory footprints. This can be problematic on
32-bit platforms, where the amount of the addressable memory
space is limited. ASan [29], for example, inserts red zones into
every memory object and maintains a direct-mapped shadow
bitmap to store addressability information. Consequently, ASan
increases the memory usage of the SPEC2006 benchmarks by
3.37x on average. Guard page-based memory safety sanitizers,
such as Electric Fence [30] and PageHeap [31], insert entire
memory pages at the end of dynamically allocated objects,
and therefore have even bigger memory footprints. In general,
however, most sanitizers increase the program’s memory
footprint by less than 3x on average, even if the sanitizer
stores metadata for every object or pointer in the program.
VIII. DEPLOYMENT
We studied the current use of sanitizers. Our goals were to
determine (i) what sanitizers are favored by practitioners and
(ii) how they differ from those that are not.
A. Methodology
Popular GitHub repositories: We compiled a list of
the top 100 C and top 100 C++ projects on GitHub and
examined their build and test scripts, GitHub issues, and
commit histories. Most of the sanitizers we reviewed need
to be integrated into the tested program at compile time. A
program’s build configuration would therefore reveal whether
it is regularly sanitized. Our examination of the test suites and
testing scripts further showed which sanitizers can be enabled
during testing. Contrary to the build system/configuration files,
references to sanitizers that instrument programs at run time
(e.g., Memcheck) would show up here.
Sanitizer web pages: We examined the web sites for
sanitizer tools and looked for explicit references to projects
using the sanitizer and acknowledgments of bug discoveries.
Search trends: We examined and compared search trends
for different sanitizers. We used AddressSanitizer as the
baseline in the search trends as our study indicates that it
is currently the most widely deployed sanitizer.
B. Findings
AddressSanitizer is the most widely adopted sanitizer:
We found that AddressSanitizer (ASan) is used in 24 and 19 of
the most popular C and C++ projects on GitHub respectively. We
believe that this popularity can be attributed to several of ASan’s
strengths: (i) ASan detects the class of bugs with the highest
chance of exploitation (memory safety violations), (ii) ASan
is highly compatible because it does not incur additional false
positives when the program is not fully instrumented (e.g.,
because the program loads non-instrumented shared libraries),
(iii) ASan has a low false positive rate in general and false
positives that do occur can be suppressed by adding annotations
to the program, or by adding the location where the false
positive detection occurs to a blacklist, (iv) ASan is integrated
into mainstream compilers. Enabling ASan therefore requires
only trivial changes to the tested program’s build system, and
(v) ASan scales to large programs such as the Chromium and
Firefox web browsers. A weakness of ASan, and of other
sanitizers that combine location-based checking with red-zone
insertion, is that it produces false negatives.
One interesting observation is that DBT-based memory safety
sanitizers such as Memcheck and Dr. Memory have nearly
identical strengths. Additionally, these sanitizers can always
instrument the full program even if part of the program’s source
code is not available. Yet, our study shows that while Memcheck
was popular before ASan was introduced into LLVM and GCC,
its real-world use now trails that of ASan. Dr. Memory, being
a much more recent tool, never achieved the same level of
adoption than either of the competitors.
The adoption rate for other LLVM-based sanitizers is
lower: MSan and UBSan have also seen adoption, mainly
due to increased attention towards vulnerabilities such as
uninitialized memory use and integer overflows. However, users
frequently report high false positive rates and avoiding them
requires significant effort. In fact, developers have to go to
great lengths to apply those sanitizers to large projects like the
Chromium web browser. To avoid false positives for MSan,
the entire program must be instrumented. In Chromium’s case,
this means that MSan must be inserted into the web browser
itself, as well as in all of its dependencies. For UBSan, the
developers maintain a long list of suppressions that most notably
suppresses all detections in the entire V8 JavaScript engine.
C. Deployment Directions
The deployment landscape hints at the desirable properties
of a sanitizer. First, all the deployed sanitizers are easy to
use. Specifically, they can be enabled via a compiler flag
(Clang sanitizers) or can be applied to any binary (Memcheck).
Second, the false positive rate and adoption are inversely related,
i.e., fewer false positives means higher adoption (ASan and
Memcheck vs. MSan and UBSan). Third, performance overhead
is not a primary concern (Memcheck is used), but is avoided
when a faster alternative is available (Memcheck vs. ASan).
Our own experience of applying sanitizers to the SPEC
benchmarks shows that research prototypes suffer even more
from false positives than widely deployed sanitizers. ASan
successfully ran all the benchmarks, correctly reporting known
bugs in SPEC. Memcheck ran all benchmarks except for
447.dealII, which takes more than 48 hours to finish. In
contrast, SoftBound+CETS fails to run many of the benchmarks
raising false alarms, due to strictness (e.g., not supporting
integer-pointer casts) and compatibility (e.g., failure to update
bounds for pointers created in uninstrumented libraries) issues.
LFP failed to run several benchmarks, because the assumed
invariant that OOB pointers do not escape the creating function
is too strict. DangSan provides their own patches to circumvent
incorrect invalidation of pointers.
Developers who want to sanitize memory safety issues in
their projects can pick up ASan or Memcheck without much
effort. However, they should be aware that these tools do not
detect all classes of memory safety violations. Developers
who want to adopt MSan and UBSan should expect continued
efforts for recompilation of all the dependencies and/or for
blacklisting and annotation to weed out false positives. For the
vulnerabilities not covered by these popular sanitizers (e.g.,
intra-object overflow and type errors caused by type punning),
developers currently have no viable option. Further research
in this area is required, because existing research prototypes
do not scale to real-world code bases.
IX. FUTURE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DIRECTIONS
A. Type Error Detection
Most of the publicly available sanitizers that detect pointer
type errors do so by monitoring casting operations. Such tools
can detect illegal casts, but due to type-punning constructs such
as unions and reinterpret_cast casts, it is still possible for
pointers to have an illegal type when the program dereferences
them. Pointer use monitoring can solve this problem because
it tracks the effective types of every storage location, and
can therefore detect illegal dereferences of pointers that were
derived through type punning. Unfortunately, only one publicly
available tool monitors pointer uses (LLVM TySan) and it is
still a research prototype [69]. We were not able to get TySan
to work on non-trivial programs. TySan also has high memory
overhead because of its large metadata. Pointer use monitoring
therefore remains an interesting area of research. Advances in
pointer use monitoring will help address the general problem
of accurate pointer type error detection, which other sanitizers
face as well. For example, variadic function misuse sanitizers
will benefit from this, allowing precise detection of mismatches
in variadic argument types.
B. Improving Compatibility
Although there exist other memory vulnerability sanitizers
with better precision, AddressSanitizer (ASan) is by far the
most deployed sanitizer. We believe that the primary reason for
ASan’s wider deployment is its excellent compatibility with the
de facto language standards, and with partially instrumented
programs. We encourage future research and development
efforts to make other sanitizers equally compatible.
C. Composing Sanitizers
Sanitizers typically detect one particular class of security
bugs. Embedding multiple sanitizers is unfortunately not
possible at present because existing sanitizers use a variety
of incompatible metadata storage schemes (several of which
change the pointer representation). Current practice is therefore
to test the program multiple times, once with each sanitizer.
This requires developers to make an additional investment in
time and effort.
We encourage further research into efficient metadata storage
schemes that are sufficiently generic to support a wide variety
of sanitizers [81], [95], and into sanitizers that build on
such metadata storage schemes. This problem could also be
addressed by using multi-variant execution systems to run
multiple variants of the same program in parallel on the same
inputs. Different sanitizers can be embedded in each variant,
allowing incompatible sanitizers to run in parallel [96], [97].
D. Hardware Support
Hardware features can lower the run-time performance
impact of sanitization, improve bug detection precision, and
alleviate certain compatibility issues. The idea of using special
hardware instructions to accelerate memory safety violation
detection has already been extensively explored [57], [98],
[99]. Recent Intel CPUs even include an ISA extension called
memory protection extension (MPX) built for memory error
detection [82]. Intel MPX improves the speed of the software
implementation of the same mechanism, though there is still
room for improvement [100].
In addition, hardware features could improve compatibility
and precision. For example, ARM’s virtual address tagging
allows top eight bits of the virtual address be ignored by the
processor. This can be used to implement the tagged pointer
scheme which does not incur binary compatibility issues,
because dereferencing a tagged pointer in an non-instrumented
library no longer leads to processor faults. This tag also propa-
gates back to the instrumented library, potentially increasing the
bug detection precision. Hardware-assisted AddressSanitizer,
being developed as of writing, uses this feature to detect
both spatial and temporal memory safety violations at lower
performance and memory costs than AddressSanitizer [101].
E. Kernel and Bare-Metal Support
Sanitizers have traditionally only been available for user-
space applications. Lower-level software such as kernels,
device drivers and hypervisors is therefore missing out on the
security benefits of sanitization. Unfortunately, security bugs
may have the most disastrous consequences in such low-level
software. Efforts are ongoing to remedy this problem. Projects
led by Google, for example, are bringing AddressSanitizer
and MemorySanitizer to the Linux kernel [102], [103]. We
encourage these efforts and hope to see other classes of
sanitizers adopted to lower level software. One challenge
for this is to reduce the sanitizer’s memory footprint. While
memory overheads of 3x or more are acceptable in user-space
applications for 64-bit platforms, such overheads could be a
problem for lower level software on 32-bit architectures. The
Linux kernel, in particular, is often compiled and run on 32-bit
platforms (e.g., on IoT devices).
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APPENDIX A
We measured the run-time performance overhead of 10 tools
by running all 19 SPEC CPU2006 C/C++ benchmarks (or all
7 C++ benchmarks for type casting sanitizers) on a single
experimental platform. To assist future sanitizer developers
in measuring the relative overhead of their tool, we open-
sourced our fully automated build and benchmarking scripts
at https://placeholder.edu/spec-scripts1.
A. Scope
We included sanitizers that are either actively maintained
and/or were published within a decade. For sanitizers that
are not publicly available, we sent the authors a request
for source code access. However, the authors either did not
respond [39], [53], [54], or refused our request because of
licensing restrictions [37], [47] or code quality concerns [34],
[55]. We excluded several sanitizers that either failed to compile
or run more than half of the benchmarks [46], [52], [69], or
do not support our experimental platform [31]. CaVer caused
several instrumented binaries to run significantly faster than the
1The scripts will be made available upon acceptance of this paper
baseline binaries [65]. Since these speedups were not reported
in the original paper, and since we did not have time to properly
investigate the cause of these speedups, we decided to exclude
CaVer from our evaluation. In the end, we evaluated 10 tools.
B. Experimental Setup
We conducted all experiments on a host equipped with an
Intel Xeon E5-2660 CPU with 20MB cache and 64GB RAM
running 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04.5 LTS. Unless stated otherwise, we
used the system default libraries installed in the OS distribution.
C. Results
We ran each benchmark three times with the sanitizer and
report the median for each run normalized to the baseline.
We used the median of three runs without the sanitizer as
the baseline result. We also report and give details about false
positives encountered while running benchmarks in this section.
Table III summarizes the overheads and false positives.
1) Memcheck: We used the official version of LLVM/-
Clang 6.0.0 to compile the baseline binaries. We measured
Memcheck’s overhead by running Valgrind 3.13.0 with the
--tool=memcheck option. We excluded 447.dealII as it
does not finish within 48 hours.
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2) AddressSanitizer: We used the official version of LLVM/-
Clang 6.0.0 to compile the baseline binaries, and compiled the
AddressSanitizer binaries using the -fsanitize=address
flag for that same compiler. We patched several known bugs in
400.perlbench and 464.h264ref to avoid crashing those
benchmarks early. We disabled detection of memory leaks and
alloc/dealloc mismatches.
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TABLE III
NORMALIZED PERFORMANCE OVERHEADS AND FALSE POSITIVES
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Memcheck [26] 39.7 14.1 21.0 4.34 24.9 23.9 26.8 9.81 31.9 17.5 11.0 28.5 13.4 24.4 10.9 47.8 23.0 34.0 19.6
ASan [29] 4.27 1.71 2.32 1.47 2.17 2.01 2.31 1.39 2.37 2.24 1.62 2.77 1.44 1.58 2.48 1.65 2.99 1.07 1.93 1.99
Low-fat Pointer [40], [41] 2.52 1.76 2.27 1.40 1.87 2.49 1.73 1.92 2.64 1.46 1.76 1.96 1.54 1.95 2.16 1.94 2.44 1.47 2.06 1.93
DangSan [56] 3.63 1.02 1.55 1.50 1.13 1.01 1.03 0.92 0.99 6.83 1.51 2.28 1.34 1.00 1.25 1.09 1.56 1.00 1.01 1.40
MSan [62] 3.50 2.04 3.51 2.16 2.51 3.68 3.49 1.93 3.40 2.24 1.95 2.21 1.99 1.96 2.62 1.95 3.29 2.20 2.85 2.53
TypeSan [66] 1.64 0.99 1.41 0.99 1.81 1.00 1.24 1.26
HexType [67] 1.13 1.01 1.08 1.00 1.18 1.02 1.01 1.06
Clang CFI [64] 1.46 1.00 1.16 1.00 1.09 0.99 1.03 1.09
HexVASAN [74] 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.03 1.00 1.04 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01
UBSan [63] 2.20 2.33 1.98 1.90 3.04 6.68 2.94 2.87 4.31 4.26 2.22 5.37 2.38 2.08 9.16 2.67 3.01 1.24 3.02 2.97
3) Low-fat Pointer: We used LFP’s version of LLVM/-
Clang 4.0.0 to compile the baseline binaries and used the
-fsanitize=lowfat flag for that same compiler to generate
the LFP binaries. We used the default size encoding in the
low-fat pointer representation. As CPUs in our experimental
platform do not have bit manipulation extensions, we removed
optimization flags using those extensions, though they are
enabled in author’s build script. We disabled early program
termination after check failures to measure the overhead for
benchmarks with known false positives.
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4) DangSan: We used the official version of LLVM/Clang
3.8.0 to compile the baseline binaries, and the DangSan plugin
for that same compiler to generate the DangSan binaries.
DangSan requires linking with the GNU gold linker and link
time optimization (-flto) enabled, so we used gold and -flto
to link the baseline binaries as well. Similarly, since DangSan
uses tcmalloc as the default memory allocator, we enabled
tcmalloc for the baseline binaries too. We did not enable
-fsanitize=safe-stack for the baseline binaries, since it
incurs overhead. To avoid false positives in 450.soplex, we
applied the pointer unmasking patch provided by the authors.
We marked 400.perlbench as having false positives based on
their metadata invalidation workaround present in tcmalloc.
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5) MemorySanitizer: We used the official version of LLVM/-
Clang 6.0.0 to compile the baseline binaries, and used the
-fsanitize=memory flag for that same compiler to generate
the MemorySanitizer binaries. We used instrumented versions
of libcxx and libcxxabi when running C++ benchmarks.
This addresses a false positive detection in 450.soplex. We
disabled early program termination after check failures to
measure the run-time overhead for 403.gcc.
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6) TypeSan: We used TypeSan’s version of LLVM/Clang
3.9.0 to compile the baseline binaries and we generated the
TypeSan binaries using the -fsanitize=typesan flag for
that same compiler. TypeSan uses tcmalloc as its default
memory allocator, so we used an unmodified version of
tcmalloc in the baseline binaries too.
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7) HexType: We applied HexType’s patches to the official
version of LLVM/Clang 3.9.0 and used that compiler to
generate both the baseline and the HexType binaries. We
used the -fsanitize=hextype for the HexType binaries.
We enabled all type casting coverage and optimization features
supported by HexType. This is consistent with the experiments
performed by the authors.
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8) Clang CFI: We used the official version of LLVM/-
Clang 6.0.0 to compile the baseline binaries, and used the
-fsanitize=cfi flag for that same compiler to generate the
Clang CFI binaries. Clang CFI inserts checks (i) for casts
between C++ class types and (ii) for indirect calls and C++
member function calls (virtual and non-virtual). We enabled
-fno-sanitize-trap to print diagnostic information.
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9) HexVASAN: We applied HexVASAN’s patches to the
official version of LLVM/Clang 3.9.1 and used that compiler
to generate both the baseline and the HexVASAN binaries.
We used the -fsanitize=vasan for the HexVASAN. We
disabled early program termination after check failures to
measure the run-time overhead for 471.omnetpp, which has
a known false positive reported in the HexVASAN paper.
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10) UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: We used the official ver-
sion of LLVM/Clang 6.0.0 to compile the baseline binaries, and
used the -fsanitize=undefined flag for that same compiler
to generate the UBSan binaries. -fsanitize=undefined
enables a carefully chosen set of sanitizers. We refer the reader
to the UBSan web page for a description of the sanitizers in
this set [63].
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